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Compelled Participation in Summary
Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases
INTRODUCTION
Summary jury trials' were introduced into the American
legal system as one possible weapon in the procedural arsenal 2
to be employed against the malady of crowded 3 federal court
dockets. The procedure, where upon the end of discovery,
attorneys summarize their case before a six-member jury that
then renders a nonbinding verdict,4 has met with generally
positive reviews from both courts and commentators. 5 While
any therapeutic innovation faces scrutiny in its application, the
delicacy of this particular patient-the due process-oriented
Federal District Judge Thomas D. Lambros is the creator of the summary
jury trial. Judge Lambros' innovativp procedure was prompted by his frustration as
to "the need for trial in such cases where both sides wished to avoid litigation, were
willing to consider reasonable settlement, and would negotiate in good faith if only
some sense of the lay perception of the case could be attained." Lambros, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, A Report
to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System, reprinted in 103 F.R.D. 461, 482 (1984). For a description of the logic
and logistics of the summary jury trial see id.
2 Other alternative dispute resolution techniques in the "arsenal" include private
arbitration, court-annexed arbitration, mediation, private judging, and the mini-trial.
For a discussion of these techniques see id. at 465-68; see also Readey, Alternative
Dispute Resolution-A Trial Lawyer's Primer, 53 INs. COUNSEL J. 300 (1986).
The backlog of cases in the federal courts provided the impetus for Judge
Lambros' invention. "On January 1, 1975, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio faced 1,973 pending civil cases. By January 1, 1980, that
Court had 3,218 civil cases on its docket." Gwin, Summary Jury Trial: An Explanation
and Analysis, Ky. BENCH AND BAR, Winter 1988, 16.
4 The nonbinding nature of the summary jury trial must be emphasized. "The
proceeding is not binding and in no way affects the parties' rights to a full trial on
the merits." Lambros, supra note 1, at 469.
5 See id., Ranii, Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, National Law Journal, June
10, 1985, at 1, col. 4, cont. at 30, col. 1. But see Posner, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,
53 U. Cm. L. REV 366 (1986).
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court system-compels an even more vigorous oversight of the
development of this procedure. 6
Whether a federal district court can require parties to par-
ticipate in a summary jury trial has been the subject of recent
controversy. At the forefront of this dispute are two recent
federal decisions, an appellate level opinion and a district court
opinion. The appellate level discussion of this issue is found in
Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois.7 This Seventh Circuit
decision held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures do not
confer upon federal district courts the power to require parties
to participate in nonbinding summary jury trials. 9 The contrary
view, that federal courts do have this power, is voiced in McKay
v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,'0 an opinion from the Eastern District of
Kentucky issued after the Strandell opinion. This Comment
examines these two opinions and highlights the differences be-
tween them that explain much of the distance between the two
courts.' By analyzing these opinions and other authorities, 12
the author hopes to reveal an approach to the question of a
federal district court's authority that responds to the concerns
of the Seventh Circuit while maintaining the vitality of the
technique. 13
6 Then Chief Justice Warren Burger welcomed such scrutiny in his 1983 Year-
End Report on the Judiciary, writing: "Legal educators and scholars can provide a
valuable service by studying new approaches and reporting on successful innovations
that can serve as models for other jurisdictions, and on experiments that do not
survive the scrutiny of careful testing." Reprinted in Lambros, supra note 1, at 465.
7 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
1 For a more detailed discussion of the role of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in this dispute see infra notes 42-49, 53-77 and accompanying text.
9 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884, 888.
120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
" See infra notes 23-97 and accompanying text.
12 The novelty of the summary jury trial technique forbids the analysis of a long
line of cases, particularly as to the narrow issue examined in this Comment.
3 See infra notes 98-119 and accompanying text. The scope of this Comment is
limited to a federal district court's power to compel parties' participation in a non-
binding summary jury trial. This Comment does not address (except when the topic
demands) the relative merits and success of the summary jury trial. For a balanced
treatment of the technique compare Lambros, supra note 1 (explaining and advocating
summary jury trials) with Posner, supra note 5 (raising some questions about the
technique).
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I. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL-A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The first summary jury trial was conducted by Judge Thomas
D. Lambros of the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio on March 5, 1980.14 This innovative alter-
native dispute resolution technique is designed to encourage
settlement in particular cases by exposing parties to a nonbind-
ing jury verdict based on a summary presentation of their
case. 15
The summary jury trial follows the pattern of a full-blown
jury trial but in a less formal and time-consuming setting.
Jurors are called from the court's regular jury pool, 16 and an
abbreviated voir dire is conducted.17 Upon the selection of the
jurors, the court advises them on the nature of the proceed-
ings. 18 Counsel for each party then summarizes each party's
case,' 9 the court gives the jury an abbreviated charge,20 and the
14 Lambros and Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEv. ST. L. Rv. 43, 43
n.1 (1980).
"' Id. Generally, counsel are given one hour each to summarize their case in the
summary jury trial. Id. at 43.
16 "From its regular jury pool, the court typically calls ten jurors who complete
biographical forms which the parties receive. The court conducts an abbreviated voir
dire and/or permits counsel to conduct a brief voir dire. Each party receives an
appropriate and equal number of preemptory [sic] challenges." Gwin, supra note 3,
at 16.
I d.
, Id. To ensure the jury's diligence, most courts conceal the unbinding nature
of the verdict until after it has been reached. Id. But see Posner, supra note 5, at 386
("If word got around that some jurors are being fooled into thinking they are deciding
cases when they are not, it could undermine the jury system.").
9 The Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division (Judge Lambros' court) has
the following rule for the summary presentation of evidence:
7. All evidence shall be presented through the attorneys for the parties.
The attorneys may summarize and comment on the evidence and may
summarize or quote directly from depositions, interrogatories, requests
for admissions, documentary evidence and sworn statements of potential
witnesses. However, no witness' testimony may be referred to unless the
reference is based upon one of the products of the various discovery
procedures, or upon a written, sworn statement of the witness, or upon
sworn affidavit of counsel that the witness would be called at trial and
will not sign an affidavit, and that counsel has been told the substance
of the witness' proposed testimony by the witness.
Reprinted in Lambros, supra note 1, at 487.
10 Gwin, supra note 3, at 17.
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jury retires and later renders its nonbinding verdict. 2' The sum-
mary jury trial generally takes as little as one day.22
II. STRANDELL: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SAYS No TO FORCED
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
A. The District Court Opinion
The Seventh Circuit held in Strandell v. Jackson County,
Illinois23 that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow
federal district courts to convene mandatory summary jury
trials. That decision reversed 24 the Southern District of Illinois'
finding that it had such a power. 25 The Strandell litigation
involved a civil rights action arising out of the alleged suicide
of a pretrial detainee. 26 The district court projected a trial
length of 20 to 25 days27 and noted that "[s]ince this Court
operates on a four-day trial week, this trial could take up five
to six weeks of the Courts' docket." 28 The district judge felt
that this protracted trial would only further crowd the docket
of one of the busiest district courts in the nation. 29
21 "If the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict within a few hours, the court
provides each juror with a verdict form to complete individually." Id.
22 Id.
23 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
2 Id. at 888.
2 Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
6 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884. The Seventh Circuit restated the facts of the case
as follows:
Mr. Tobin represents the parents of Michael Strandell in a civil rights
action against Jackson County, Illinois. The case involves the arrest,
strip search, imprisonment, and suicidal death of Michael Strandell. In
anticipation of a pretrial conference on September 3, 1986, the plaintiffs
filed a written report concerning settlement prospects. The plaintiffs
reported that they were requesting $500,000, but that the defendants
refused to discuss the issue.
Id.
I 27 Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334.
2 Id. The Southern District of Illinois operates on a four-day trial week because
Mondays are reserved for matters other than trial, such as pretrial conferences. Id.
29 Id. at 336. The district court cited the following figures as evidence of its
heavy caseload: "This Court's most recent statistics show that as of March, 1987
there were 80 criminal and 1,903 civil cases pending in this district which has three
full-time judges. In the month of March alone 320 new cases were filed." Id.; see
also Lambros and Shunk, supra note 14, at 44-45 (additional information relating to
the workloads of district courts).
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The counsel for the plaintiffs in Strandell objected to the
summary jury trial on the grounds that he would have to
"reveal his trial strategy and case preparation prior to trial and
to the benefit of the defendants." 30 The court responded that,
"[i]n modern litigation, discovery should leave little surprise to
litigants as to what their opponent's case is all about."'3 None-
theless, counsel refused to participate in the summary jury trial
and was subsequently held in contempt.32
In holding the plaintiffs' counsel in contempt for his refusal
to participate in the summary jury trial,33 the court relied on
the edit of an original draft of a Judicial Conference Committee
Report. 34 The committee had drafted a resolution endorsing the
use of summary jury trials, but "only with the voluntary con-
sent of the parties. ' 35 The final draft of this resolution sup-
porting summary jury trials did not include the "voluntary
consent" language.3 6
In addition to the Judicial Conference Committee's reso-
lution the Strandell district court also found authority for man-
datory summary jury trials in the Federal Rules of Civil
30 Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334.
3, Id. This response was shared by the district court in McKay v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988). See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying
text.
. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336.
3' The refusal of plaintiffs' counsel resulted in a citation for criminal contempt
of court and a $500 fine. Id.
14 Report of Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
Agenda G-13, 4 (September 1984). Reprinted in Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335. The
original draft read:
RESOLVED, the Judicial Conference endorses the use of summary jury
trials, only with the voluntary consent of the parties, as a potentially
effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of lengthy
civil jury cases. With proper authorization by local rules, summary jury
trials are recommended to District Courts for consideration as an optional
device.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 88
(September 1984). Reprinted in Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335. The final draft read:
RESOLVED, that the Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use
of summary jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting the
fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury cases.
1988-89]
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Procedure. The court referred to Judge Lambros' interpretation3 7
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 16
and its instructions on pretrial conferences, as granting the
district court power to hold mandatory summary jury trials. 38
The Strandell opinion found additional support for its power
to compel parties to participate in the procedure in the inherent
power of the court.39 Ultimately, the court concluded that its
7 Judge Lambros states:
The Summary Jury Trial is firmly rooted in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, SJT is within the court's pretrial
powers pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(l1) and the courts
inherent power to manage and control its docket.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Rules,
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action." FED.R.Civ.P. 1. Rule 16(a), concerning pretrial
activities, states, "In any action, the court may in its .discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties, and any unrepresented parties to appear
before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as (1) expediting the disposition of the action ... and (5) facilitating the
settlement of the case" FED.R.Crv.P. 16(a)(1) and (5). Furthermore, the
Rules recommend that settlement be discussed, as well as potential alter-
natives to trial. Newly adopted Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(c)(7) and (11) provide
that "[t]he participants at any conference under this rule may consider
and take action with respect to . . . (7) the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute . . . and (11)
such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
FED.R.Civ.P. 16(c)(7) and (11).
The SJT process recognizes the importance our judicial system places
on decisions rendered by lay jurors. This is consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P.
39(c), which provides for an advisory jdry in cases not triable to a jury
as of right. Additionally, use of the SJT is consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P.
83, which provides in pertinent part, "[iln all cases not provided for by
rule, the district court may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules." FED.R.Civ.P. 83.
Lambros, supra note 1, at 469-70.
Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335.
3 Id. at 336. In Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1985),
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld monetary sanctions against parties and
attorneys making belated settlements. The sanction was not based on a local rule but
was sustained because of the "court's inherent authority over members of the bar."
Id. at 568. The Third Circuit went on to state that
the district courts have the power, absent a statute or rule promulgated
by the Supreme Court to the contrary, to make local rules that impose
reasonable sanctions, where an attorney conducts himself in a manner
unbecoming a member of the bar, fails to comply with any rule of the
court, including local rules, or takes actions in bad faith.
Id. at 569.
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overwhelming case load, coupled with a federal district court's
obligation -under the Speedy Trial Act,40 "require that this
Court be allowed to order the parties to engage in an alternative
non-binding method of trial. '41
B. Reversal By the Seventh Circuit
The Strandell district court's contempt citation of the plain-
tiff's attorney was successfully appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. 42 In finding that the district court
lacked the power to compel participation in nonbinding sum-
mary jury trials, the Seventh Circuit stressed that the district
courts' inherent power to manage their dockets "must, of
course, be exercised in a manner that is in harmony with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' ' 4 The appellate court, in
construing Rule 16, held that the sections relied upon by the
district court "cannot be read as authorizing a mandatory
summary jury trial." 44
The Seventh Circuit gave particular weight to a contested
issue below involving the discovery process. The plaintiffs had
- 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74. For a general discussion of the Act see C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL) § 833 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336.
42 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884.
41 Id. at 886. This language mirrors the command in the federal rules that local
rules may be made that are "not inconsistent" with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED.R.Civ.P. 83.
- Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887. The appellate court took issue with the interpre-
tation that federal district courts can force unwilling parties into settlement negotia-
tions:
In our view, while the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was intended
to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures, it was
not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the
normal course of litigation. The drafters of Rule 16 certainly intended
to provide, in the pretrial conference, "a neutral forum" for discussing
the matter of settlement. However, it is also clear that they did not
foresee that the conference would be used "to impose settlement nego-
tiations on unwilling litigants . . ." As the Second Circuit, commenting
on the 1983 version of Rule 16, wrote: "Rule 16 ... was not designed
as a means for clubbing the parties-or one of them-into an involuntary
compromise."
Id. (quoting FED.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee's note and Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d
667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted).
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obtained statements from 21 witnesses during discovery. 45 The
defendant's motion to compel production of these witnesses'
statements was denied. The district court characterized the
statements as work-product and held46 that the defendants had
failed to establish "substantial need" and "undue hardship"
as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). 47
The effect of a mandatory summary jury trial on the dis-
covery process was the primary concern of the Seventh Circuit.
The court noted that the rules concerning discovery and the
work-product doctrine "reflect a carefully-crafted balance be-
tween the needs for pretrial disclosure and party confidential-
ity. .... ",48 The Seventh Circuit felt that a compelled summary
jury trial, "could easily upset that balance by requiring disclo-
sure of information obtainable, if at all, through the mandated
discovery process. ' 49 Apparently some question existed as to
the credibility of certain witnesses in Strandell.0 The attorney
who, on appeal, successfully represented the plaintiffs' counsel,
stated 5' that these credibility questions made this case unsuitable
for a summary jury trial.5 2
In addition to the work-product and discovery concerns,
the appellate court also emphasized the statutory origins of the
federal courts' powers.5 3 The opinion intimated that any expan-
sion in these powers must pass through the rigors of "the
national rule-making process outlined in the Rules Enabling
Act.' '54 While sympathetic to the district courts' workload, 55
the Seventh Circuit firmly noted that "a crowded docket does
,1 Id. at 885.
46 Id.
4' FED.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
41 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
49 Id.
50 See Marcotte, No Forced Summary Jury Trials, 74 A.B.A. J. 32 (1988).
I d.
52 For a discussion of the suitability of cases for summary jury trial see infra
notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
11 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
14 Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
11 The Seventh Circuit states: "We certainly cannot take issue with the district
court's conclusion that its caseload places great stress on its capacity to fulfill its
responsibilities." Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
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not permit the court to avoid the adjudication of cases properly
within its congressionally-mandated jurisdiction.' '56
III. McKAY v. ASHLAND OIL, INC.: THE STRANDELL DECISION
Is CHALLENGED
The Seventh Circuit's assertion that "the parameters of
Rule 16 do not permit courts to compel parties to participate
in summary jury trials" 57 did not long remain unchallenged. In
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc. ,58 the Eastern District of Kentucky
found itself in "respectful disagreement with the Seventh
Circuit ' 59 on this point. This complex case centered around a
wrongful discharge complaint against the Ashland Oil
Corporation60 and was set for a six-week jury trial if not
settled.6' The plaintiffs' original objection to the summary jury
trial was overruled, but a motion for reconsideration of that
ruling was filed after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in
Strandell.62 The McKay opinion was primarily a response to
the plaintiffs' motion, but was also a direct response to the
Seventh Circuit. 63
A. Local Rule 23
The McKay court relied on Local Rule 23 of the Joint Local
Rules for the United States District Courts of the Eastern and
56 Id. The court also noted this admonition in an earlier case: "Innovative
experiments may be admirable, and considering the heavy case loads (sic) in the district
courts, understandable, but experiments must stay within the limitations of the stat-
ute." Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978).
,1 Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988).
120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
' Id. at 44.
" The case involved allegations of illegal bribes of Middle Eastern officials by
Ashland Oil representatives. The plaintiffs maintained that their refusal to participate
in the illegal activities and the ensuing coverup resulted in their discharge from
employment. Id. For more background on the case, see the related shareholder deri-
vation action, Howes v. Atkins, 668 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
61 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44.
Id. at 43-44.
63 The opinion first disposes of the motion before the court. Id. at 43-46. Then,
in a section entitled "The Strandell Opinion: Lambros' Godchild Gets a Bum Rap,"
the court defended the summary jury trial and responded to the Seventh Circuit. Id.
at 46-51.
1988-89]
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Western Districts of Kentucky, in 'finding the power to compel
parties to participate in summary jury trials. 64 Local Rule 23
reads in full:
A judge may, in his discretion, set any civil case for summary
jury trial or other alternative method of dispute resolution. 65
Given this local rule, the dispositive question facing the court
was the rule's validity. Federal Rule 83 grants district courts
the ability to formulate local rules that are "not inconsistent"
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66 The McKay court
felt that the validity of Local Rule 23 was unassailable since
"far greater intrusions into the autonomy of trial lawyers and
parties have been upheld under the aegis of Rule 83."67 To
support this contention, the court cited an appellate decision
that upheld local rules authorizing the district judge to refer
certain cases to mandatory mediation68 and another that al-
lowed for the referral of cases to mandatory nonbinding arbi-
tration.69 The court also noted the United States Supreme Court
ruling in Colgrove v. Battin,70 which approved a district court's
64 Id. at 43-46.
65 LR 23.
66 Rule 83 provides:
Each district court by action of a majority thereof may from time
to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to
comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the day
specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless amended
by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit
in which the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made
by any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the
judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and be made available to the public. In all cases not provided for by
rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in
any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in
which they act.
FED.R.C1v.P. 83.
67 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45.
See Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
6 See Davison v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md.
1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). This case was particularly relevant given
the McKay court's characterization of a summary jury trial as "essentially nonbinding
arbitration with an advisory jury instead of arbitrators." McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45.
7- 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
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local rule allowing for jury trials with six jurors in civil trials.7'
The Supreme Court stated in Colgrove that the "require-
ment of a six-member jury is not a 'basic procedural innova-
tion.' "72 The McKay opinion, relying on a Third Circuit case 73
interpreting Colgrove, felt that this statement imposed merely
a non-outcome-determinative limitation on the scope of local
rules.74 The McKay court held that a mandatory summary jury
trial, despite its inherent expense, 75 did not affect the outcome
of the trial because the procedure is merely advisory in nature. 76
Local Rule 23, the court held, was within the ambit of local
rule limitations as defined by Colgrove.77
1' McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45.
72 Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 164 n.23.
73 Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 569 (3rd Cir. 1985).
74 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 43-44; the Supreme Court discussed the issue as follows:
Amicus also suggests that Miner [Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641
(1960)] should be read to hold that all "basic procedural innovations"
are beyond local rulemaking power and are exclusively matters for general
rulemaking. We need not consider the suggestion because, in any event,
we conclude that the requirement of a six-member jury is not a "basic
procedural innovation." The "basic procedural innovations" to which
Miner referred are those aspects of the litigatory process which bear upon
the ultimate outcome of the litigation and thus, "though concededly
'procedural,' may be of as great importance to litigants as many a
'substantive' doctrine. . . ." 363 U.S. at 650. Since there has been shown
to be "no discernible difference between the results reached by the two
different-sized juries," . . . a reduction in the size of the civil jury from
12 to six plainly does not bear on the ultimate outcome of the litigation.
Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 164 n.23 (citation omitted).
71 The expense of the summary jury trial is pivotal in any consideration of the
procedure's value as a settlement technique. The short-term costs of the procedure,
both to the parties and the court, must be weighed against the money saved in litigation
costs avoided by settlement. This measurement is, however, beyond the scope of this
Comment, and the author relies on the following discussion of costs:
Foremost, counsel cite the extra work and expense for their clients.
My answer is if it succeeds, it certainly cuts the time the lawyers would
spend in court trying the case on the merits and that alone should reduce
their clients' expenses. If the summary jury trial fails to settle the case,
the work of counsel and the Court hasn't been wasted as trial on the
merits will be scheduled shortly thereafter.
Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 835 (1986) (the text of a
speech on summary jury trials by the Hon. S. Arthur Spiegel); see also Lambros,
supra note 1, at 472-74 (discussing the court's costs in summary jury trials).
76 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 46; see also supra note 4.
" See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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Having validated its local rule and thereby disposing of the
plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, the McKay court's work was
technically finished. Still, the district judge, "in a spirit of
furthering constructive debate, ' 78 addressed the arguments of
the Strandell court. 79
B. Response to the Seventh Circuit
The McKay court characterized the discovery concerns ex-
pressed by the Seventh Circuit in Strandell as "misplaced." 80
Aligning itself with the Southern District of Illinois, 81 the court
felt that the reach of modern discovery prevents any abuse of
the summary jury trial technique, particularly when combined
with modern federal court requirements that mandate "a com-
prehensive pre-trial order, exchange of witness lists and sum-
maries of anticipated testimony, and the listing and marking
of all exhibits." 8 2 These measures, the McKay court main-
tained, eliminated "[t]rial by ambush ... from the federal
system."8
3
The effect that a summary jury trial has on discovery re-
quires the consideration of two additional points. First of all,
the evidence presented during the summary jury trial is com-
pletely left to the discretion of the respective parties. 84 Privi-
leged information does not have to be presented. If a party
7' McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 46.
7' Id. at 46-51.
8o Id. at 48.
1, See Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
82 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48.
87 Id. The Seventh Circuit might respond, however, that, while trial by ambush
has been removed, respect for the work-product privilege still remains a constraint on
discovery.
"* A party may withhold evidence it feels the other party is seeking for trial.
This half-hearted participation, however, might make that party feel even less bound
by the verdict of the summary jurors. This scenario-a party merely going through
the motions of the mandatory summary jury trial, with no desire for pretrial settle-
ment-points out the potential futility of forcing unwilling litigants to participate in
nonbinding settlement techniques. Still, the advocates of summary jury trial maintain
that the technique provides an outlet for the adversary emotions of the opposing sides
and forces them to more rationally weigh the benefits of pursuing trial. By providing
the parties with a more objective perspective the summary jury trial is supposed to
increase the likelihood of settlement, even by unwilling participants. See id. at 50.
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feels that the summary jury trial is being used as a parasitical
discovery device he may withhold certain information from the
process. Secondly, the "verdict" rendered by the group of
jurors is used merely to encourage settlement.85 If a party feels
the brevity of the technique has obscured the true merit of his
case, he may continue to trial without penalty. 6
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRANDELL AND McKAY
While the Strandell 7 and McKay's opinions are in "respect-
ful disagreement,' ' 9 differences between the two cases have
kept their actual holdings from being completely contradictory.
The two primary differences are the presence of Local Rule 23
in McKay, and the different postures of the litigants resisting
the summary jury trial in each case.
A. Effect of the Presence or the Absence of a Local Rule
A pivotal difference between Strandell and McKay is the
presence of Local Rule 23 in the Eastern District of Kentucky. 90
The Strandell district court had no such rule to turn to for the
authority to order the participation of the plaintiffs' attorney.9'
The absence of a similar local rule in the Southern District
of Illinois suggests the question of whether Local Rule 23 would
have prevented the Seventh Circuit's reversal. The answer seems
to be an emphatic "no." The presence of a local rule would
not have allayed the discovery and work-product concerns voiced
by the Seventh Circuit. Also, the appellate court's fear that the
"carefully-crafted balance between the needs for pretrial dis-
closure and party confidentiality ' 92 might be upset by manda-
tory summary jury trials would not have been appeased by a
Is See supra note 4.
86 Although in theory a party may proceed to trial with impunity, this trial will
be presided over by a federal district court judge who may not be pleased with that
party's failure to settle.
,7 Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
8 McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
89 Id. at 44.
goId.
91 Id.
91 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
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local rule. Deference to a district court local rule would not
seem likely from an appellate court which so diligently upheld
the principle that any extension of a'federal district court's
powers go through the proper channels. The Seventh Circuit
stated:
We do not believe it is reasonable to assume that the
Supreme Court and the Congress would undertake, in such
an oblique fashion, such a radical alteration of the considered
judgments contained in Rule 26 and in the case law. If such
radical surgery is to be performed, we can expect that the
national rule-making process outlined in the Rules Enabling
Act will undertake it in quite an explicit fashion.9
It seems doubtful, given this oath of allegiance to the systematic
evolution of court rules, that the Seventh Circuit would have
felt constrained by Local Rule 23.
B. Differing Postures of the Protesting Litigants
A second difference between the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Strandell and the McKay opinion is the type of legal issue
each court addressed. The McKay opinion is merely a response
to a party's motion for reconsideration of an overruled objec-
tion.94 The court's denial of the motion was not appealed to
the Sixth Circuit, 95 and the disgruntled plaintiffs ultimately
participated in the summary jury trial.96 The Seventh Circuit,
on the other hand, was faced with a party whose refusal to
participate in the summary jury trial resulted in a citation for
contempt and a $500 fine.9 7 The plaintiffs' attorney in Strandell
9, Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966) (giving the U.S. Supreme Court the
authority to prescribe rules of civil procedure for the federal courts).
94 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44.
9 The McKay case ultimately went to a jury trial. The plaintiffs were victorious,
and a settlement was achieved pending the defendants' appeal.
16 The McKay district judge stated that he was "gambling a five-day summary
jury trial against a six-week real trial." McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49. The fact that the
case ultimately went to a full trial indicates that in this instance, the gamble failed.
Yet it should be noted that summary jury trials can provide benefits other than
settlement. For example, the technique may "aid in streamlining jury trials so that
the trial process undergoes a more efficient use of time." Lambros, supra note 1, at
468.
7 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885.
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had taken the strongest stand possible against the summary
jury trial. The decision to uphold a contempt citation against
a member of the bar who is acting to protect his client is
perhaps not as easily made as the decision to overrule an
objection.
V. SURVIVAL OF THE SuMMARY JURY TIAL: Is ComIULsoRY
PARTICIPATION ESSENTIAL?
A major question facing summary jury trial advocates in
the wake of Strandel9 8 is whether the technique will remain
viable if the district court lacks the power to compel parties'
participation. As noted earlier, 99 the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky and the Southern District of Illinois did not receive the
same response when they attempted to compel parties to par-
ticipate in summary jury trials. Undoubtedly, numerous tangi-
ble and intangible variables affected the differing decisions of
the Strandell and McKay'00 plaintiffs. Two possible considera-
tions for the parties were (1) the presence of a local rule, and
(2) the propriety of the summary jury trial technique in each
case. Discussion of these two issues helps to point toward a
future for the summary jury trial.
A. Chilling Effect of Local Rule on Attorney Resistance
While the correlation may be forced, the fact remains that
between Strandell and McKay, the court with a local rule was
able to compel participation in its summary jury trial and the
court without a local rule was defied. Perhaps stronger evidence
of the power of a local rule may be found in the novelty of
the issue of the district courts' power. The first summary jury
trial was held on March 5, 1980.101 The Seventh Circuit's Jan-
uary 21, 1988,102 opinion in Strandell was the first appellate-
" Strandell v. Jackson County, III., 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
" See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
'0 McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
,o, See Lambros and Shunk, supra note 14, at 43 n.1.
101 The Strandell appeal was argued before the Seventh Circuit on September 10,
1987, and decided on the same day. The opinion was dated January 21, 1988, as
corrected January 28, 1988. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884.
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level discussion of a district court's power to compel partici-
pation in the procedure. 0 3 The acquiescence of the Bar in the
interim indicates a belief that district courts have the power to
compel participation, or at least a perception that the issue is
not worth appealing.
The Northern District of Ohio, the birthplace of the sum-
mary jury trial and a court with a local rule, had assigned 131
cases for summary jury trials as of April 1985,104 without having
their authority challenged to an appellate court. The Eastern
District of Kentucky, prior to the McKay opinion, had held
five summary jury trials without any appeal to the Sixth Cir-
cuit. 0 5 While these statistics are not conclusive, they provide a
basis for the argument that a local rule places a district court
in a "stronger position"'0 6 when faced with a reluctant party.
The McKay district judge noted that in two of the cases he has
settled via the summary jury trial, "but for my making sum-
mary jury trials mandatory in these cases, they would not have
occurred."10
7
If mandatory summary jury trials are engrained into the
procedural rules of a court, parties would seem less likely to
103 The few opinions that have addressed mandatory summary jury trials point
to a split between the appellate and district courts. The Strandell and McKay district
judges are aligned with District Judge Lambros in support of the proposition that
district courts can compel a party's participation. The Southern District of Ohio,
while not forced to decide the issue, has stated: "We believe that the Court has the
power to conduct summary jury trials either under Rule 16, Fed.R.Civ.P., or as a
matter of the Court's inherent power to manage its own cases." Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that
qualified first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings does not attach to
summary jury trial).
101 Ranii, supra note 5, at 30, col. 1.
105 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
,06 Id. at 44; the Third Circuit has stated that a district court may "make local
rules that impose reasonable sanctions where an attorney conducts himself in a manner
unbecoming a member of the bar, fails to comply with any rule of court, including
local rules, or take actions in bad faith." Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d
557, 569 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). This language indicates that if the local
rule is valid, the attorney may be sanctioned for disobeying it.
10 McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49; the McKay court also responded to Judge Posner's
request for scientific data on the success of the summary jury trial by stating that "a
controlled scientific experiment such as that suggested by Judge Posner cannot be
effectively conducted unless summary jury trials are mandatory." Id. at 49. For a
statement of Posner's criteria for evaluation, including his requests for scientific
verification, see Posner, supra note 5, at 366-68.
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be surprised or offended by the procedure. The district judge
in Strandell noted that "attorneys are usually reluctant to par-
ticipate in procedures which break from traditional and familiar
methods of litigation."108 The McKay district judge also noted
attorney reluctance but stated that "the attorney who objected
to the first summary jury trial he was required to participate
in is now the biggest local fan of the procedure."' 1 9 This
conversion capsulizes that court's belief that the inertia of the
Bar is an easily surmountable barrier to the success of certain
alternative dispute resolution techniques. Naturally, district
courts desire the ability to compel participation in these pro-
cedures and demonstrate (and evaluate) their merits. Local rules
allowing for mandatory summary jury trials would seem a
necessary and effective tool in combatting attorney reluctance,
and ultimately the larger opponent-crowded court dockets.
B. The "Right" Case for a Summary Jury Trial
In the summary jury trial, the abbreviated presentation of
evidence limits a party's ability to expose the jury to certain
weaknesses of their opponent's case. This trade-off of thor-
oughly tested evidence for increased expediency, may be fatal
to certain cases. As noted earlier, the Strandell litigation sup-
posedly involved questions about the credibility of witnesses." 0
If witness credibility is central to the litigation, then the advi-
sory verdict of the summary jurors is based upon an inadequate
exposition of the relevant evidence. The strong belief that a
summary jury trial was improper in his particular case undoubt-
1o Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333, 336 (S.D. Ill. 1987). The
district court continued: "Reliance on totally voluntary use of nonbinding alternative
dispute resolution procedures where the attorneys are aware of the Court's inability
to mandate their participation will severely undermine the utility of such procedures."
Id.
log McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49. It should be noted that both the district and
appellate courts are charged with balancing "the needs for judicial efficiency and the
rights of the individual litigant." Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886-87. The perspective each
court brings to this challenge is, however, inherently different. The appellate court
reviews an objective record, virtually free of influence by the personality of any
litigant. The district court judge is constantly exposed to the frustration of uncoop-
erative litigants.
1 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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edly strengthened the Strandell attorney's resolve in the face of
a contempt citation.
The success of the procedure depends upon the wise use of
the district court discretion as to when it should be employed.
Judge Lambros developed the summary jury trial for
a large class of cases where the only bar to settlement
among parties is the uncertainty of the perception of liability
and damages held by the members of a lay jury. These cases
involve issues, similar to "the reasonable man" standard in
negligence litigation, where no amount of jurisprudential re-
finement and clarification of the law can aid in resolution of
the case."'
Even such a staunch defender of the summary jury trial tech-
nique as the author of the McKay opinion, Judge William 0.
Bertelsman of the Eastern District of Kentucky, does not see
the technique as a "panacea' 1 2 or adaptable to a large volume
of cases.11 3 The nature of the summary jury trial" 4 demands a
district judge's contemplation of the technique's propriety.
C. Strandell Meets McKay: A Possible Reconciliation
The propriety of the summary jury trial must be weighed
against the necessity of compelled participation for its survival.
These two considerations are not, however, irreconcilable. The
local rule relied upon by the McKay court makes the district
court judge's decision to hold a summary jury trial discretion-
ary.1" s Even if such a rule were in place in the Southern District
of Illinois when Strandell was decided, the Seventh Circuit
would not be forced to invalidate the rule to reverse the district
court's contempt citation. If the appellate court felt strongly
"I Lambros and Shunk, supra note 14, at 45. Judge Bertelsman, the author of
the McKay opinion, states that: "I believe a summary jury trial is a useful device,
however, to settle a complex case with one or two key issues, where the problem with
settlement is that the parties differ in their views of how the jury will react to the key
issues." McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49-50.
112 Id. at 49.
113 Id.
114 The expense of the process and the pressure placed on the attorneys demand
a court's serious consideration of whether to hold a summary jury trial.
"I See supra text accompanying note 65 for the text of Local Rule 23.
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enough about the impropriety of the technique, they could
simply rule the order mandating the party's participation an
abuse of discretion. Under this approach attorneys who feel
they cannot in good conscience proceed with the summary jury
trial may still protest but must face the heightened "abuse of
discretion" burden of proof at the appellate level.
CONCLUSION
The Strandell and McKay opinions are not at war with one
another. Rather, they reflect the necessary struggle'16 involved
in implementing new judicial procedures and the differing roles
district and appellate courts play in this process.1 7 The district
court opinions supporting mandatory summary jury trials"8
indicate the near desperate district courts' willingness to make
a pragmatic stand against the problem of docket congestion.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Strandell represents the ap-
pellate level view that any technique which expands the federal
district court's power must pass through the rigors of the Rules
Enabling Act. " 9
These two competing positions seem to be best balanced by
allowing the federal district courts to mandate summary jury
trials at their discretion with appellate level reversal only when
this discretion is abused. This safety net for cases that are not
116 The district courts' sensitivity to any assault on their power to mandate
participation in alternative dispute resolution techniques is largely attributable to their
burgeoning caseloads. This sensitivity is implicitly shown by the following statement
from the McKay opinion: "Some appellate courts have also backed up the trial judges
in the trenches by upholding local rules providing for the imposition of costs as a
sanction for last-minute settlements entered into after the taxpayers have incurred the
expense of bringing in the jury." McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 45
(E.D. Ky. 1988) (emphasis added). This quote reflects the view that the district court
is the foot soldier who daily encounters the enemy, overwhelming docket congestion.
The appellate court is cast as the dispassionate arbiter of the propriety of their
weapons, and the inference is that on some occasions the foot soldiers in the trenches
aren't always "backed up."
"7 This experimentation and review approach to alternative dispute resolution is
in line with the "scrutiny" and "careful testing" of new techniques that Chief Justice
Burger solicited in his 1983 Year-End Report on the Judiciary. See Lambros, supra
note 1, at 465.
I's See McKay, 120 F.R.D. 43; Strandell v. Jackson County, I1l., 115 F.R.D. 333
(S.D. Ill. 1987).
119 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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proper for the technique does not leave the district judge a
David with an unloaded slingshot-an unacceptable position
given the Goliath-like dockets.
Paul Mattingly
